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THE MAKING AVAILABLE ARGUMENT:
IS ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED TO FIND
INFRINGEMENT UPON THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER’S
DISTRIBUTION RIGHT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The advancement of technology has prompted a revolution that alters
the amount of freely and easily accessible information.1 The widespread
use of computers, electronic networks, and the Internet have added to the
wealth of readily accessible information.2 The amount of information
available is constantly increasing and expanding across a vast array of categories.3 Government documents, newspaper articles, college campus tours,
and airplane tickets are all available with the click of a mouse.4 This new
inventory of information is recorded on a digital medium, which allows the
creation, publication, distribution, use, and reuse of information to occur
faster and easier than ever before.5
The benefit of these technologies is the colossal growth in information
available to society.6 Conversely, the same technologies raise difficult and
controversial issues concerning intellectual property.7 Copyright infringement is one such issue, because the technologies that make access easy also
make illegal copying and illegal distributing easy.8 The Internet is an information resource of extraordinary size and depth, making it one of the
world’s largest libraries.9 The Internet is also the world’s largest copy machine and distributer.10 As a result, many of the copyright rules and prac-

1. COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE,
COMPUTER SCI. AND TELLCOMM. BD., THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 23 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].
2. Id.
3. See BRUCE J. MCLAREN, UNDERSTANDING AND USING THE INTERNET 8 (1997 ed.) (stating that the amount of information available on the internet is unlimited).
4. Id.
5. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 23.
6. Id.
7. See GRETCHEN MCCORD HOFFMAN, COPYRIGHT IN CYBERSPACE 2, 101 (2005) (noting
technology used to make unauthorized copies of digital files). Intellectual property is a category
of intangible rights, consisting primarily of trade secrets, trademarks, copyrights, and patent
rights, which protect commercially valuable products of the human intellect. See MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 24-30 (4th ed. 2007).
8. See HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 101 (explaining the ease of file-sharing).
9. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 23.
10. Id.
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tices that evolved in the world of physical artifacts are easily violated in a
digital environment.11
All media industries are affected by the outdated copyright laws of today’s digital world, but the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) arguably has been impacted the most.12 Alvin Toffler might describe the RIAA as residing in a state of “future shock.”13 Future shock, as
described by Toffler, is a psychological state that results when individuals
and societies undergo technological change too quickly.14 Future shock is
present in our society’s nexus of music, digital technology, and copyright
law, where our laws have failed to adequately address the legal issues that
arise from their combination.15 Peer-to-peer networks, filesharing, MP3s,
and Internet Protocols are terms that cannot be found in the 1976 Copyright
Act; they did not even exist at the time of the Act’s creation.16 The RIAA
responded to its future shock by choosing to pursue litigation.17
This article examines the RIAA’s claim that making a copyrighted
work available for distribution over a peer-to-peer computer network—the
making available argument—is a violation of the copyright holder’s exclusive distribution right.18 Part II of this article focuses on the RIAA’s lawsuits against users of peer-to-peer networks and the framework of the
RIAA’s making available theory. Part III discusses landmark decisions that
11. Id. at 25.
12. See HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 102 (explaining that RIAA has used a lot of resources
against those using file-sharing).
13. See ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 13 (1970) [hereinafter FUTURE SHOCK] (defining
future shock as “the dizzying disorientation brought on by the premature arrival of the future.
Future shock is. . . a product of the greatly accelerated rate of change in society.”). Toffler, noted
futurist and author of four books about the digital, corporate, and communications revolutions,
served as Visiting Professor at Cornell University and the Russell Sage Foundation. ALVIN
TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 544 (1980).
14. FUTURE SHOCK, supra note 13, at 13.
15. DRAEKE WESEMAN, FUTURE SHOCK AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: IS MERELY
MAKING A COPYRIGHTED WORK AVAILABLE FOR DIGITAL TRANSMISSION A VIOLATION OF
§ 106(3) 1 (2008), available at http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/future_shock_making_
available.pdf.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing the definitions within the Copyright Act); WESEMAN,
supra note 15, at 1. A peer-to-peer network is a computer communication model in which computers collaboratively perform a task, such as a file transfer. DAVID BARKAI, PEER-TO-PEER
COMPUTING: TECHNOLOGIES FOR SHARING AND COLLABORATING ON THE NET 305 (2001). Two
identifying characteristics of peer-to-peer networks include the lack of a central control server,
which allows direct communications between two users, and efficient use of the network’s capacity. Id. An MP3, the common name of an MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 file, is the most popular digital
audio compression algorithm in use on the Internet. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999). The compression algorithm makes
the audio file “smaller” by limiting the audio bandwidth without significantly reducing sound
quality. Id.
17. See WESEMAN, supra note 15, at 2.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright holders).
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provide analyses of a copyright holder’s exclusive right of distribution.
Two decisions, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas19 and Atlantic Recording
Corp. v. Howell,20 provide foundational principles for discussion and analysis of the arguments offered by both proponents and opponents of the making available argument.21 Finally, this article proposes that Congress
amend the outdated Copyright Act.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF MAKING AVAILABLE LITIGATION
In lawsuits filed against individual consumers, the RIAA contends, as
its foundational legal theory, that making a file available for distribution
constitutes copyright infringement.22 The following analysis of the making
available argument will begin with an explanation of the argument’s underlying law—the Copyright Act. Part C will describe a peer-to-peer network’s architecture, operations, and facilitation of digital file distribution,
which will serve as an introduction to the evidence the RIAA uses to support its claims.
A. THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The framers of the Constitution granted Congress the power to regulate
copyright laws.23 The constitutional provision promoting “the Progress of
Science and useful Arts . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”
bestowed that power upon Congress.24 Acting on that power, Congress
provided several revisions to the original Copyright Act of 1790.25 The
first major change occurred in the early twentieth century.26 The Copyright
Act of 1909 provided for several substantial changes, one of which expanded the scope of the copyright law to cover “all writings of an author.”27
Additionally, the 1909 Act doubled the term of copyright protection from
two fourteen-year terms to two twenty-eight year terms and protected work

19. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
20. 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008).
21. See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
22. See Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant at 1-2, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497)
[hereinafter EFF Thomas Brief] (providing part of the jury instructions from the RIAA’s first jury
trial using the making available argument).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Id.
25. HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id.; Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
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with notice of copyright immediately upon publication.28 Congress
amended the 1909 Act several times to keep the act current in an
increasingly technological world.29 The Sound Recording Act of 1971 was
one such amendment.30 This amendment accorded federal statutory
protection to sound recordings for the first time.31 In 1955, Congress
authorized a revision of the Copyright Act, and after twenty years, that
authorization resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976.32
The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act provided for two vital developments.33 First, digital advancements required that the law take a new look
at the scope of copyrights to determine what other types of works should be
afforded copyright protections and if certain conduct should constitute
infringement.34 Additionally, a need existed for a new statute that would
bring the United States into alignment with international copyright laws and
policies.35
The 1976 Copyright Act provided a copyright owner with five exclusive rights to ensure the opportunity to use the product for profit.36 The five
exclusive rights are: “(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . ; (2) to prepare derivative works . . . ; (3) to distribute copies [of the work] . . . ; (4) . . .
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and] (5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly. . . .”37 The United States Copyright Act of 1976
gave copyright owners the exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work by sale, lease, or other transfer to the public.38 While the language seems straightforward, it is very broad.39 As a result, the statutory

28. HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 7. Under the original Act, the first term renewed after expiration only if the author survived. Id. The original Act also required works to be registered to gain
copyright protections. Id.
29. Id.
30. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
31. See id.
32. HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 7; see David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly,
51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) (providing an evaluation of every provision of the 1976 Act
and every adopted amendment through 2003).
33. LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE 1990S 17 (Special Libraries Association) (1994).
34. Id.
35. Id.; see discussion infra Part III.D.2 (noting the implications of international treaties on
the interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).
36. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 33, at 19.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
38. Id. § 106(3).
39. John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of American: Review
and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1989).
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language has been the focus of many copyright infringement lawsuits filed
by the RIAA against individual consumers.40
B. LAWSUITS FILED BY THE RIAA AGAINST CONSUMERS
In 2003, the RIAA, a large, wealthy, corporate entity, began a massive
litigation campaign on behalf of the four largest recording companies in the
world: Vivendi/Universal, Warner Brothers Records, SONY BMG, and
EMI.41 The RIAA filed two hundred sixty-one lawsuits against individuals
using peer-to-peer networks.42 Each lawsuit alleged that users infringed on
sound recording copyrights owned by the RIAA.43 Each suit filed by the
RIAA contained a variation of the following complaint: “Plaintiffs are informed and believe that each Defendant, without the permission or consent
of Plaintiffs, has used, and continues to use, an online media distribution
system to download, distribute to the public, and/or make available for distribution to others, certain of the Copyrighted Recordings.”44
After the initial 261 lawsuits were filed, the RIAA sued an estimated
30,000 people in district court for copyright infringement.45 The targets of
these lawsuits included children, grandparents, unemployed single mothers,
and college professors—a random sample of the millions who use peer-topeer networks.46 The RIAA brought at least one lawsuit against a deceased
individual, who the RIAA claimed made more than 700 songs available for
distribution.47 The RIAA filed another lawsuit against a family who neither
owned a computer nor had Internet access.48 A majority of defendants in
the RIAA’s lawsuits defaulted.49 This resulted in the RIAA receiving

40. See discussion infra Part II.B.
41. See Ray Beckerman, Large Recording Companies v. The Defenseless: Some Common
Sense Solutions to the Challenges of the RIAA Litigations, 47 JUDGES J. Summer 2008, at 20
(stating that the four largest record companies have started litigation and are represented by the
RIAA).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. E.g., Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 1, London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 04cv12434-NG) (emphasis added) (indicating the
RIAA argues that making a file available constitutes copyright infringement).
45. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER 1
(2008), available at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter FIVE YEARS].
46. Id.
47. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead 83 Year Old Deceased Woman in Copyright
Violation, THE REGISTER, Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_
dead/.
48. Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Computer-less Family, 234 Others, for File Sharing, ARS
TECHNICA, Apr. 24, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060424-6662 html/.
49. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 20.
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default judgments in amounts greater than 2,000 times the actual damages
sustained by the plaintiffs.50
Analysts have determined that the wholesale price of each song file is
approximately seventy cents.51 The RIAA’s actual realized damages resulting from each illegal download are estimated at thirty-five cents.52 Copyright owners have the option of electing to pursue actual damages or statutory damages against an infringer of their copyrights.53 In lieu of proving
thirty-five cents per song file in actual damages, the RIAA chooses to pursue statutory damages.54 By statute, for each illegally downloaded song, a
copyright owner is allowed to collect a sum of not less than $750 or more
than $150,000.55 In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,56 the only case
known to have gone to trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff damages that
amounted to $9,250 per song.57 This amount represents nearly 23,000
times the actual damages.58
Of the defendants who do not default, most agree to pay a settlement of
$3,000 to $11,000 to avoid paying a potential $100,000 judgment.59 The
average settlement amount is in excess of 1,000 times the plaintiff’s actual
damages.60 A great number of the defendants who chose to settle likely
never engaged in any form of illegal file sharing.61 Also, it has not been
generally established whether the act of file sharing constitutes copyright
infringement.62
The reasons defendants agree to settlements with the RIAA need to be
considered.63 The defendants settle because the alternative is going to trial,
which when drawn out, is not practical.64 The risk of an adverse verdict results in such a large financial penalty, that even with the best defense,
defendants are too fearful to fight the allegations of copyright
50. Id.
51. Id. at 29 n.3.
52. Id.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (listing the possible remedies for copyright
infringement).
54. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 29 n.3.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006) (describing the statutory damages available for copyright infringement).
56. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
57. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213. Accord Beckerman, supra note 41, at 29 n.3 (discussing the reasons defendants choose to settle their lawsuits against the RIAA).
58. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 29 n.3.
59. FIVE YEARS, supra note 45, at 5.
60. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 20.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
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infringement.65 A Chicago court awarded a $22,500 judgment against a
woman who fought and lost a lawsuit the RIAA brought against her.66
Similarly, an Arizona court entered a $40,850 judgment against a man who
defended himself pro se.67 Furthermore, the only file-sharing case to be
tried by a jury found the defendant liable for $220,000 in statutory damages
for making twenty-four songs available for others to download over the
Internet.68
Of the defendants who have neither defaulted nor settled, but have chosen to defend their claims, very few have had any form of legal representation.69 These defendants represent themselves to avoid attorneys’ fees from
extensive litigation.70 The actions taken by the defendants in the RIAA’s
lawsuits raise concerns.71 The RIAA is waging a litigious war against individuals who can ill-afford the costs of litigation.72 Compounding the dilemma, the claims brought by the RIAA are based on interpretations of law
that are in need of clarification.73 In Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v.
O’Brien,74 the Central District of California stated, “[t]he concern of this
Court is that in these lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual defenses are not being litigated, and instead, the federal judiciary is being
used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to pound settlements out of
unrepresented defendants.”75 To understand how the RIAA supported these
allegations of copyright infringement, the next section discusses the basic
framework of a peer-to-peer network.

65. See id.
66. FIVE YEARS, supra note 45, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (D. Minn.
2008) (providing background and history of the case).
69. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 20.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1689
(2005).
73. See id.
74. No. CV 06-5289 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007), available at
www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDFfull.asp?filename=elektra_obrien_070302Decision.
75. O’Brien, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555 at *2. O’Brien was accused of sharing copyrighted
works over a peer-to-peer network. Id. The RIAA filed an amended complaint adding a second
defendant without providing any factual support that the defendants were in any way related to
each other, acted together, or acted as a group in the infringement action. Id. The RIAA was ordered to show cause why the case against the defendants should not be dismissed. Id.
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C. THE NATURE OF PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS
Today’s digital technology allows novice computer users to record audio in the form of compact discs.76 The users may then compress the compact discs into digital files that require little storage space.77 Consequently,
these compressed sound recordings, which exhibit little to unnoticeable degradation in sound quality, are easily downloaded or uploaded via the Internet.78 One popular way computer users transfer these sound recordings is
through peer-to-peer networks.79
There are several different forms of peer-to-peer networks, each with
distinct advantages and disadvantages.80 However, this article focuses on
the “pure” peer-to-peer architecture.81 The pure, or decentralized, peer-topeer network software allows users to communicate directly, without the
need to route transmissions through a central server—thus the term “peerto-peer” as opposed to “client-server.”82 A user of a peer-to-peer network
requires only a single connection to a current peer-to-peer user to be virtually connected to everyone with whom the current user is connected.83
Once a user downloads the peer-to-peer software, the role of the software
provider is terminated.84 Due to the lack of a central server, peer-to-peer
networks self-operate and continue to run even if the software provider’s
computer network is inaccessible.85 As a result of the elimination of a central server, users on a peer-to-peer network may “remain relatively anonymous or pseudonymous.”86 Any file transactions occurring through peerto-peer networks “are not easily observable by a third party.”87 When two
computers interact through a peer-to-peer network, the only user-

76. Michael Suppappola, The End of the World As We Know It? The State of Decentralized
Peer-to-Peer Technologies in the Wake of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 4 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 122, 126 (2004).
77. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing
the process of “ripping” a compact disc). Ripping software allows an individual to store the audio
recordings on the disc directly on the computer’s hard drive. Id. The ripping process converts the
data on the compact disc to a compressed file format called MP3. Id. The compressed format of
MP3s allows for accelerated transfers from one computer to another via peer-to-peer networks.
Id.
78. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 124.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 125.
81. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D. Mass. 2008).
82. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 126.
83. David J. Colletti, Jr., Technology Under Siege: Peer-to-Peer Technology Is the Victim of
the Entertainment Industry’s Misguided Attack, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 265 (2003).
84. Id.
85. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 126.
86. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
87. See id. at 159-60 (noting that users can be easily identified by a user name).
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identifying information exchanged consists of the user’s Internet Protocol
(IP) address and the user-name pseudonym under which each user
operates.88 The very nature of a peer-to-peer network and its corresponding
software is to easily allow peer-to-peer users to control the information
displayed to the world.89 The software’s simplicity and user-friendly
interface allows anyone with the software and an Internet connection to
participate in open peer-to-peer networks and transfers.90
Although peer-to-peer networks are routinely used for transferring
copyrighted sound recordings to other users, the networks serve many other
non-illegal purposes as well.91 Many of the files transferred over peer-topeer networks are lawful.92 The elimination of a central server to mediate
the exchange of files allows peer-to-peer network users to complete file
transfers using less bandwidth and time.93 Peer-to-peer users also do not
have to consider the possibility of server failure when transferring files.94
A large quantity of copyrighted files are transferred via peer-to-peer
networks as well.95 The very nature of the peer-to-peer network has made
it a viable, attractive, and practical option for individuals to share and
expand their digital libraries.96 Peer-to-peer networks create significant
problems for copyright owners who have tried to enforce copyright protections.97 Peer-to-peer networks also pose an incredible challenge for the
RIAA.98 The RIAA responded to the challenge with litigation premised on
the argument that making a protected work available for distribution is an
infringement of the owner’s copyright.99

88. See id. (summarizing the basic operation of peer-to-peer networks).
89. Id. at 159.
90. Id.
91. See HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 101 (“[n]othing is inherently wrong with file-sharing”).
92. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
93. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005).
94. Id.
95. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 67 (2004).
96. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (noting the anonymity of its users, the inability
of third-parties to observe transactions, and the limited bandwidth required for speedy transfers
and its ease of use). Bandwidth is “[t]he transmission capacity of an electronic pathway such as a
communications line,” and is typically used to describe how much information can be transferred
over a connection. PCMAG.com, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=bandwidth
&i=38401,00.asp (last visited Aug. 11, 2009).
97. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 127.
98. See id. at 123 (noting that the RIAA’s strategy of directly suing users of file sharing programs often results in suing their own customers).
99. WESEMAN, supra note 15, at 3-4.
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D. THE MAKING AVAILABLE ARGUMENT
To combat copyright infringement over peer-to-peer networks, the
RIAA relies on the theory that making copyrighted works available for distribution to others is a violation of a copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right under section 106(3) of the Copyright Act.100 This theory is labeled the “making available” claim.101 According to section 106(3): “The
owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of the following: . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. . . .”102 The language the RIAA uses in its complaint
of copyright infringement is mostly boilerplate and contains no facts pertaining specifically to each individual defendant.103 The complaint alleges
that a defendant infringed the sound recording copyrights owned by the
RIAA by using a peer-to-peer network to download, publicly distribute, or
make available for distribution a copyrighted work without the RIAA’s
permission or consent.104 The allegation appears to be direct and clear, but
defendants argue, and judges have ruled, that the allegation fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.105
E. THE EVIDENCE
The evidence that the RIAA uses to support its claims against file
sharers operating on peer-to-peer systems is gathered by a third-party investigator named MediaSentry, Inc.106 MediaSentry has been hired by the
RIAA to search peer-to-peer networks for other computer users who make
copyrighted sound recordings available for additional peer-to-peer users to
download.107 When MediaSentry finds copyrighted files, it downloads the
files from the computer user that made them available.108 During the

100. Id. at 2.
101. See Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *4
(W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006) (stating that the court was not prepared to rule out the RIAA’s making
available theory).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2007).
103. Interscope Records v. Rodriguez, No. 06cv2485-B (NLS), 2007 WL 2408484, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007).
104. E.g., Complaint for Copyright Infringement, supra note 44, at 159.
105. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008)
(admitting that the court created a manifest error of law by allowing the making available argument in his jury instructions); Rodriguez, 2007 WL 2408484, at *1 (denying the RIAA’s motion
for entry of default judgement and vacating the Court Clerk’s entry of default).
106. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159-60 (D. Mass. 2008).
107. Id. at 160.
108. Id.
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process, MediaSentry obtains information about the computer user.109 The
information typically includes a user-name, a list of downloaded songs, and
several screen captures indicating the date and time at which the files were
made available and downloaded by MediaSentry.110 MediaSentry also acquires the peer-to-peer user’s IP number.111
After MediaSentry downloads the files from the peer-to-peer user, it
reviews a listing of the music files to determine whether they are copyrighted sound recordings.112 The music files are then played to confirm that
the files are indeed sound recordings whose copyrights are owned by the
RIAA.113 Upon confirmation that the music files are copyrighted works
owned by the RIAA, the RIAA concludes that it has enough evidence and
subsequently files a lawsuit.114
However, several problems arise with the evidence obtained by
MediaSentry.115 These problems limit the RIAA’s allegations.116 One
problem is that MediaSentry acts on behalf of the RIAA.117 Therefore,
MediaSentry’s downloads may be authorized and not considered copyright
infringement.118 Additionally, the RIAA is unable to prove that the peer-topeer user actually transferred files to another computer other than the

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. An IP number is also known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address. Id. Every computer on the Internet has an IP address, which uniquely defines that computer and enables computers to find each other on the Internet. See, e.g., America Online v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d
848, 851 (E.D. Va. 2000) (discussing the basic communication between computers on the Internet). Each IP address is represented by a series of four numbers between 0 and 255. Id. However,
most computer users do not have a constant IP address or “static” address. London-Sire, 542 F.
Supp. 2d at 160. Instead, many computer users connect to a network that is provided by their
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Id. The ISP has a certain range of IP addresses that it can assign
to its users, and it makes these assignments on an as-needed basis. Id. This process is known as
“dynamic” addressing and makes the RIAA’s task of discovering the identity of a particular infringer very difficult. Id. Difficulty arises because one IP address that records show belongs to
one particular user’s computer may be assigned to another user’s computer. See H. Brian Holland,
Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting Rights & Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH.
L. & POL’Y 301, 305 nn.13-18 (2005). IP addresses lead the RIAA to the user’s ISP, and the ISP
typically records a log of the IP address assigned to each user at a particular time. London-Sire,
542 F. Supp. 2d at 160. However, those logs are typically purged after a short period of time. Id.
112. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (D. Mass. 2008).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 166.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. (“Arguably . . . MediaSentry’s own downloads are not themselves copyright
infringements because it is acting as an agent of the copyright holder, and copyright holders cannot infringe their own rights.”). The court did not reach the issue in London-Sire. But see Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding that downloads
performed by MediaSentry were unauthorized).

382

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:371

computer used by MediaSentry during its investigations.119 Finally, the
evidence gathered by MediaSentry cannot ascertain that the files on the
peer-to-peer user’s computer are illegitimate copies of music “spaceshifted” from the peer-to-peer user’s own CD collection to the user’s
computer hard drive.120 Therefore, the only claim generally supported by
the direct evidence obtained by MediaSentry is the RIAA’s making available claim.121 Due to the fact that the RIAA is unable to establish actual
distribution between two individual peer-to-peer users, the RIAA is forced
to pursue their claims using the making available theory.122 The adoption
of this interpretation of the Copyright Act without an unequivocal expression of congressional intent will have many disruptive consequences.123
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER INTERPRETATION:
WHAT IS AT STAKE
Several reasons exist to interpret and understand the Copyright Act in
the way Congress intended.124 One such reason derives from the immense
penalties provided by law to an individual who is guilty of copyright infringement.125 Claims of copyright infringement are broadly construed to
contain two elements: (1) proof of ownership, and (2) proof of a use in
violation of one or more exclusive statutory rights, provided to the
owner.126 Since copyright cases do not require proof of actual damage,
satisfying the two required elements leads to statutory damages that are

119. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76 (holding a file that was downloaded at least
once sufficient to make out a prima facie case).
120. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079
(9th Cir. 1999). “Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent
with the purposes of the [Audio Home Recording Act of 1992].” Id. Congress created the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992 “to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio
recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.” S. REP. NO. 102-294, at
86 (1992). The Diamond court used the term “space-shifting” in reference to a copyright law
concept that would allow owners of a copyrighted work to convert the work from one format to
another, such as converting an audio compact disc to MP3 files. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1079. The
court analogized space-shifting to the term “time-shifting” used in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio. Id.; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio, 464 U.S. 417, 455
(1984). In Sony Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that the time-shifting of copyrighted
television shows with VCRs constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act and thus is not an infringement. Sony Corp., 464 U.S at 455.
121. See EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 2 (stating that the RIAA is unable to properly
prove that copies of protected works have been distributed and that harm was inflicted on the copyright owner).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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exceedingly out of proportion to any actual harm the copyright holder
realizes.127 Considering the serious consequences that arise from copyright
infringement’s strict liability damages system, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation urges courts to be cautious not to expand copyright protections
beyond the scope of Congress’ intent.128
There are two types of copyright infringement: direct copyright infringement and secondary copyright infringement.129 Under direct infringement, the plaintiff must show proof of ownership of a valid copyright and
proof that the defendant created a copy.130 The copying requirement can be
satisfied by either of two ways.131 It can be satisfied by submitting direct
evidence of copying or by presenting evidence establishing the defendant
was able to access the copyrighted work and that the copy is substantially
similar to the original work.132 After meeting the initial requirements, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated one of the copyright
holder’s exclusive protections.133 Knowledge or intent to infringe is not
required to find direct copyright infringement.134
Secondary copyright infringement applies when defendants do not personally engage in the violating activity but still take a share of responsibility for the infringement.135 Secondary copyright infringement falls into two
categories: contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.136 Contributory copyright infringement requires that a defendant “has knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.”137 Vicarious copyright infringement re-

127. See id. (stating that in Thomas, the defendant was found statutorily liable by the jury for
more than $222,000 for allowing the public to download various copyrighted songs from her
shared folder); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(C)(1) (2004) (describing the statutory damages available
for copyright infringement).
128. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 16. The Electronic Frontier Foundation is donorfunded nonprofit organization based in California that works to protect the public interest in issues
related to technology that affect an individual’s fundamental and digital rights. About EFF:
Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/about (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
129. Mark E. Harrington, On-line Copyright Infringement Liability for Internet Service
Providers: Context, Cases & Recently Enacted Legislation, 1999 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.
60499, ¶ 13 (1999).
130. Harrington, supra note 129, ¶ 14.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. ¶ 15.
136. Id.
137. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
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quires the defendant to have the right and ability to control the infringer’s
acts and to receive a direct financial benefit from the infringement.138
By accepting the making available theory, courts could make the copyright laws so complex they jeopardize the legitimate interests of consumers
and technology innovators alike.139 Broadcasters rely on compulsory and
negotiated licenses that entitle them to publicly broadcast copyrighted
works over the air.140 If courts find the distribution right to support the
RIAA’s making available argument, questions would be raised whether
broadcasters are required to obtain additional distribution licenses.141 For
example, in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio,142 the RIAA
used the making available argument against XM Satellite Radio.143 The
RIAA alleged that the radio service infringed upon its copyrights by distributing copyrighted sound recordings to the public through satellite radio
transmission, even though XM had a license to do so.144 The idea that
distribution occurs when a copyrighted work is made available puts the distinction between public performance and distribution in peril.145 Therefore,
webcasters and broadcasters are potentially exposed to massive infringement liability.146
Other attempts to use expansive interpretations of distribution focus on
transferring secondary liability claims to direct infringement claims.147 In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,148 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
heard the argument of Perfect 10 that the Internet search engine Google infringed on Perfect 10’s distribution right.149 Perfect 10 accused Google of
making Perfect 10’s copyrighted photographs available to the public on
138. Id. at 1162.
139. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 13.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. No. 1:06-cv-03733-DAB, 2007 WL 136186 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007).
143. See XM Satellite Radio, 2007 WL 136186, at *1-2 (alleging XM’s portable “Inno” device, which was marketed highlighting the device’s recording and library capabilities, induced
contributory infringement). Atlantic and XM reached an undisclosed settlement in December
2007, but other RIAA companies continued to pursue litigation. JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET
LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 274 (6th ed. 2008); EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
144. XM Satellite Radio, 2007 WL 136186, at *1-2.
145. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
146. Id. (citing Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is
clear that merely transmitting a sound recording to the public on the airwaves does not constitute a
distribution.”)).
147. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007) (alleging
Google’s internet search engine was violating Perfect 10’s distribution right by making links to
files of Perfect 10’s copyrighted work, which were uploaded to the internet by third-parties, available to the public).
148. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
149. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162.
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Google’s search engine.150 Perfect 10 sought a direct infringement claim
against Google even though the photographs were uploaded to the Internet
by third parties without any evidence that users actually copied the photographs.151 Similar direct infringement claims could be made against other
businesses that have created systems to aid individuals in finding copyrighted works via the Internet.152
If the meaning of distribution should be expanded to include the
RIAA’s making available argument, that expansion should derive from
Congress, not the courts.153 It is sound policy, and supported by history, for
courts to yield judgment and defer to Congress when significant advances
in technology raise questions concerning copyright law.154 Numerous cases
before the United States Supreme Court emphasized the need for congressional guidance before courts rule and expand the statutory rights under the
Copyright Act.155
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.156 is an
example of such a case.157 In Teleprompter, producers of a copyrighted
television show alleged the owners and operators of a community antenna
television (CATV) system infringed on the producer’s copyrights by intercepting the television show’s broadcast and rechanneling it through their
CATV system to paying subscribers.158 In making its ruling, the Supreme
Court noted that the growth of the communications industry can not be
controlled through litigation based on the 1909 Copyright Act where neither
broadcast television nor cable television had yet been conceived.159 The
court further noted that an ultimate resolution to the sensitive and important
problems found in the explosive development of cable television must be
left for Congress to decide.160
Another example is Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.161
In Bonito, the Supreme Court declined to allow a state statute to provide for

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001).
153. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
157. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414 (“Detailed regulation of these relationships, and any
ultimate resolution of the many sensitive and important problems in this field, must be left to
Congress.”).
158. Id. at 396-97.
159. Id. at 414.
160. Id. at 414, 422.
161. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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greater industrial design protections.162 In reaching its decision, the Court
noted Congress’ explicit refusal to alter copyright law, despite the fact that
Congress has been subject to years of criticism regarding its refusal to expand copyright protections.163
Additionally, The Electronic Frontier Foundation suggests that the
making available argument acts to undermine civil procedure and labels the
argument as a “thinly veiled attempt to avoid the burden of proving their
case.”164 Thousands of cases in all areas of law are annually dismissed because plaintiffs are unable to present the necessary evidence required to establish what would otherwise be a meritorious case.165 Although it may be
difficult for the RIAA to obtain the proper and necessary evidence required
to prove actual distribution, alleviating the RIAA’s difficulties is not a reason to expand the law’s plain statutory language.166
III. ANALYSIS THROUGH LANDMARK DECISIONS
The cases discussed in this part of the article provide important
analyses on how to interpret section 106(3). National Car Rental Systems,
Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.167 is notable because it provided an interpretation of section 106(3) and provided a framework for
subsequent cases.168 Next, Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints169 issued a ruling that broadened copyright protections and provided a foundation for the RIAA’s making available theory.170 Atlantic Recording Corporation v. Howell addressed the definition of distribution,
whether distribution is synonymous with publication, the admissibility of
evidence obtained by MediaSentry, and if digital transfers meet the definition of exchanges found within the Copyright Act.171 Finally, Capitol

162. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 168 (holding a Florida statute that provided a patent-like protection
of ideas pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause).
163. Id. at 167-68.
164. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 14.
165. Expert praises, criticizes, Atlantic v. Howell decision, http://government.zdnet.com/
?p=3783 (Apr. 30, 2008, 22:17 EST) (citing posting of William Patry to The Patry Copyright
Blog). William Patry, author of the blog, is regarded as one of the leading copyright commentators and has published a seven volume treatise on copyright law. Id.; William F. Patry—Biography, http://west.thomson.com/about/keyauthor/patry.aspx.
166. See EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 13-14 (expressing the opinion that the law
should not be interpreted to further aid the RIAA in filing lawsuits against consumers engaging in
noncommercial activity within their own homes).
167. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
168. See discussion infra Part III.A.
169. 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
170. See discussion infra Part III.B.
171. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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Records, Inc. v. Thomas addressed how an expanded definition of distribution, the impact of international treaty agreements, and large statutory damage awards affect the Copyright Act.172
A. NATIONAL CAR RENTAL SYSTEM, INC. V. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
In National Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether National Car Rental Systems, Inc. (National), violated the Copyright Act and its license agreement with Computer Associates International,
Inc. (Computer Associates), when National used a computer program licensed by Computer Associates to process data for other companies.173
Computer Associates created software and licensed its software for other
businesses to use.174 National used licensed software from Computer Associates.175 By the terms of the licenses, National could use the software for
its own internal operations only, and in no event could National use the
software to process the data of a third party.176
Computer Associates filed suit against National, alleging that National
used the program to the benefit of a third party.177 Computer Associates
further alleged that National’s breach of contract constituted an infringement of Computer Associates’ copyright because it created an unauthorized
copy of the software.178 In order to address the complaint, the court was required to determine whether National’s improper usage of Computer Associates’ program violated a right equivalent to one of the exclusive rights
under the Copyright Act.179 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that contractual restrictions regulating the use of programs was a
supplemental requirement and withdrew the cause of action for copyright
protection.180 Therefore, the court held that making programs available for
use by third parties did not constitute distribution.181 The court stated,
“even with respect to computer software, the distribution right is only the
right to distribute copies of the work. As Professor Nimmer has stated,
172.
173.
1993).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See discussion infra Part III.D.
National Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 427-28 (8th Cir.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 432-33.
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‘[i]nfringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination
of either copies or phonorecords.’”182
National Car Rental System, although not directly related to the copyright infringement of peer-to-peer networks, established precedent in the
Eight Circuit on how section 106(3) should be interpreted.183 Several
courts have relied on National Car Rental System in making their determinations on how to interpret section 106(3) in the context of peer-to-peer
network downloading.184 In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited to the National Car
Rental System court’s determination of how to establish “distribution.”185
B. HOTALING V. CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a library
owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Church) made
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted microfiche file authored and copyrighted by the Hotalings.186 Several of the Church’s branch libraries, located throughout the United States, received unauthorized copies.187 The
Hotalings learned of the unauthorized copies and filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against the Church.188
The Hotalings asserted that the Church’s libraries infringed upon their
copyright protections by distributing the unauthorized copies of their work
to the public.189 Although the Hotalings were unable to prove that anyone
viewed the unauthorized copies in the Church’s libraries, they argued that
because the libraries held the unauthorized copies in their collection and
made them publically available, there was sufficient evidence to establish
distribution within the meaning of section 106(3).190 The Church argued
that holding a work in a library collection open to the public was considered
nothing more than an offer to distribute.191 In order to establish actual

182. Id. at 434 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A], at 8-124.1 (2001)).
183. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D. Minn. 2008).
184. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (D. Ariz. 2008) (including a lengthy analysis of National Car Rental System); Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (dedicating a section of the opinion to an analysis of National Car Rental System).
185. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Chirst of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir.
1997).
186. Id. at 201.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 201-02.
189. Id. at 203.
190. Id. The libraries did not keep a record of the public’s use of the microfiche files. Id.
191. Id.

2009]

NOTE

389

distribution, evidence must prove that a member of the public accepted such
an offer.192
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded when a public library
includes a work in its collection, lists the work in its indexing system, and
makes the work accessible to the public, all the requirements of a distribution to the public have been met. 193 The court also noted that if the
library’s actions did not establish a distribution, copyright holders would be
prejudiced by a library that does not keep records of the public’s use.194
Courts have interpreted Hotaling to conclude that making a file available
for others to download over a peer-to-peer network constitutes distribution.195
C. ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION V. HOWELL
In Atlantic Recording Corporation v. Howell, Atlantic Recording Corp.
(Atlantic) filed a copyright infringement claim against Jeffery Howell on
August 29, 2006.196 The RIAA’s investigator, MediaSentry, discovered
that Howell had 2,329 sound recordings, including specific sound recordings to which Atlantic owned copyrights, in his computer’s shared folder
available to peer-to-peer users.197 Evidence of Howell’s infringement consisted only of screenshots of Howell’s shared folder, his peer-to-peer username, and his IP address.198 With this evidence, Atlantic moved for summary judgment, claiming there was no disputed issue of material fact.199
Atlantic alleged that Howell violated its exclusive distribution right by
placing these files in his peer-to-peer shared folder and making them available for all other peer-to-peer users to download.200
The United States District Court granted Atlantic’s summary judgment
motion.201 In making this determination, the court cited Perfect 10 and

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415,
at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006) (“Listing unauthorized copies of sound recordings using an online file-sharing system constitutes an offer to distribute those works, thereby violating a copyright owner’s exclusive right of distribution.”); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487
F.3d 701, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that under the Hotaling analysis, if an owner of a work
makes the work openly available to the public, the owner will be deemed to have distributed copies of the work).
196. Howell, 2007 WL 2409549, at *1.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *6.
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Hotaling and held that the distribution of copyrighted material did not require a physical transfer.202 Furthermore, if an individual makes copyrighted works available to the public, that individual may be deemed to
have distributed the works in violation of section 106(3).203 The court concluded that peer-to-peer users commit direct infringement when using peerto-peer networks to make copyrighted works available to other users.204
Additionally, whether an individual directly oversees the unauthorized distribution is relevant.205 The court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed because Howell admitted at his deposition that sound
recordings were distributed from his peer-to-peer shared folder.206
Howell argued that he owned the compact discs of the song recordings
in question, and simply converted the discs into digital music files on his
computer for personal use.207 However, the fact that Howell owned
authorized copies of the sound recordings was irrelevant.208 What was relevant was whether he distributed the copies of the recordings without
authorization.209 Howell’s right to use the copyrighted sound recordings
purchased for personal enjoyment did not grant him the right to distribute
those sound recordings to others without the copyright holder’s authorization.210
The court granted the RIAA’s summary judgment motion and awarded
statutory damages in the amount of $40,500.211 Howell filed a Motion to
Reconsider on August 30, 2007.212 The court granted the motion and called

202. Id. at *3 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 718-19 (9th Cir.
2007), Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997),
and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2001)).
203. Id.
204. See id. (citing Interscope Records v. Duty, No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL
988086, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006)) (noting that possession of copyrighted sound recordings in
a peer-to-peer shared folder may constitute copyright infringement); Warner Brothers Records,
Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006) (finding
that the placement of music files in a peer-to-peer shared folder was a publication under 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 because the act is either a distribution or an offer of distribution where further distribution
can occur); Arista Records LLC v. Gruebel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (ruling
that screenshots, which show the contents of a defendant’s peer-to-peer shared folder, constituted
a cognizable claim for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).
205. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 986 (D. Ariz. 2008).
206. Id. at 979.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 983.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Order at 7, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 876 (D. Ariz. 2008) (No.
CV-06-02076-PHX-NVW).
212. See Motion to Reconsider at 3, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976
(D. Ariz. 2008) (No. 2:06-CV-02076-PHX-NVW) (disputing Howell’s deposition statements and
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for further briefing in April 2008.213 On April 29, 2008, the court delivered
a four-part analysis of the RIAA’s making available argument, and ultimately concluded that the claim failed to establish unlawful distribution.214
The Howell court’s analysis serves as a framework for how courts interpret
several components of the RIAA’s making available argument.215 The
analysis focuses on the following: (1) how the courts should define “distribution;” (2) determining if distribution is synonymous with publication; (3)
evaluating whether evidence obtained by an investigator hired by the RIAA
is admissible; and (4) considering whether digital transmissions constitute
exchanges as required by the Copyright Act.216
1.

Defining Distribution

The Howell court’s analysis notes that section 106(3) does not define
the term “distribute,” and that the courts must interpret the statutory meaning of the word.217 The court determined that an abundance of authority exists to support the general rule that infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination of a copy.218 The Howell court also noted
that different jurisdictions have found that making a work available for
download on a peer-to-peer network established distribution.219 Most
courts, however, avoid addressing the making available argument by denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff failed to prove
actual distribution.220 The Howell court noted, “unless a copy of work
arguing that Howell never placed the copyrighted sound recordings in his peer-to-peer shared
folder or authorized the sharing of those files).
213. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
214. See id. at 986.
215. See discussion infra Part III.C.1-4.
216. See discussion infra Part III.C.1-4.
217. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).
218. Id. (citing Nat’l Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l. Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th
Cir. 1993)); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 718 (9th Cir. 2007); London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168-69 (D. Mass. 2008); Musical Prods., Inc. v.
Roma’s Record Corp., No. 05-CV-5903(FB)(VVP), 2007 WL 750319, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2007); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Labus, No. 89-C-797-C, 1990 WL 120642, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 1990); 2
NIMMER, supra note 182, 8-149 (2007); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9, 1313 (2007); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.5.1, 7:125 to 7:126 (3d ed.
2005)).
219. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (citing Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood,
441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190-91 (D. Me. 2006) and Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, No. 04-CV2246, 2007 WL 576284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007)).
220. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (citing Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Payne, 2006 WL
2844415, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006)) ( “[T]he Court is not prepared at this stage of the proceedings to rule out a possible ground for imposing liability.”); Interscope Records v. Duty, 2006
WL 988086, at *3 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) (“To be clear, we do not conclude that the presence of copyrighted sound recordings in Duty’s share file constitutes copyright infringement.”);
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changes hands in one of the designated ways, a ‘distribution’ under section
106(3) has not taken place.”221 Furthermore, the court reiterated its position, stating the sole act of making a file publically available to download
does not violate a copyright holder’s exclusive right of distribution.222 The
court acknowledged that evidence showing an individual made a work
available for distribution to the public can support an inference that a copy
was likely transferred to another individual.223 However, on its own, the
evidence establishes only that an individual attempted to distribute a copy,
thereby failing to prove that a copy actually changed hands.224
2.

Determining Whether Distribution Is Synonymous
With Publication

The second question in the Howell court’s analysis asked whether an
offer to distribute constitutes distribution.225 The RIAA argued that even
though the term “distribution” is not precisely defined in title 17 of the
United States Code, it should be considered synonymous with the term
“publication.”226 The RIAA’s argument thus provided that if an individual
offered to distribute copyrighted works to other individuals for the purpose
of further distribution, the individual distributed the works as a matter of
law within the meaning of section 106(3).227 The court disagreed, and concluded that there was no contextual support for equating distribution and
publication.228

Arista Records v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (denying the motion to
dismiss because the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs at early
stage of proceedings)).
221. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 984.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. The statutory definition of “publication” is “[t]he offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for the purposes of further distribution. . . . ” 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2006).
227. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
228. Id. at 984. The court acknowledged that the terms were synonymous within the context
of first publication. Id.; see also Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552
(1985) (holding that publication of portions of a work that is soon to be published does not qualify
as “fair use”). The fair use doctrine allows for certain uses of copyrighted works, without
permission or payment, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Fair use generally allows a user, contingent
upon the licensing agreement, to make a digital backup copy of a copyrighted work such as
software, music, or a movie. See id. (noting that the character, purpose and economic impact of
the use are factors taken into consideration in determining fair use). However, it is illegal to share
with or give to others backed up copies of copyrighted works. Id.
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The court found that under section 101, all distributions to the public
constitute publications, but not all publications are distributions.229 The
court reasoned that if the two words were truly synonymous, the statute’s
definition of “distribution” would be unsatisfactory, because it could be
read that distribution meant “‘distribution’ or an offering to distribute.”230
A plain reading of section 106(3) indicates that a distribution requires a
“sale or other transfer of ownership” or a “rental, lease, or lending” of a
copy of the work.231 The statute, as interpreted by the Howell court, requires an identifiable copy of a copyrighted work to change possession in a
prescribed way for distribution to occur.232 Therefore, the court found that
the RIAA failed to prove an actual distribution of any of the forty-two
copyrighted sound recordings at issue.233
3.

The Admissibility of Evidence From the RIAA’s Investigator

Next, the Howell court considered whether the RIAA may rely on the
twelve downloads its investigator, MediaSentry, received from Howell to
establish proof of actual distribution.234 The Electronic Frontier Foundation
argued that a copyright owner cannot infringe upon its own copyright.235
Therefore, downloads from an individual’s shared folder by MediaSentry,
an agent of the copyright holder, cannot be considered infringement because MediaSentry acted on the owner’s behalf.236 The court addressed this
issue and determined that the RIAA did not license MediaSentry to
229. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 984 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F.
Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008)).
230. Id. at 985.
231. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §106(3) (2006)).
232. Id.
233. Id. The court in London-Sire Records reached the same determination when it noted
that the statute clearly suggests distribution is not synonymous with publication. London-Sire,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008). The London-Sire court provided a simple but detailed
example to illustrate its holding that all distributions are publications, but not all publications are
distributions:
For example, suppose an author has a copy of her (as yet unpublished) novel. If she
sells that copy to a member of the public, it constitutes both distribution and publication. If she merely offers to sell it to the same member of the public, that is neither a
distribution nor a publication. And if the author offers to sell the manuscript to a publishing house for purposes of further distribution, but does not actually do so, that is a
publication but not a distribution. Plainly, publication and distribution are not identical. And Congress’ decision to use the latter term when defining a copyright
holder’s rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) must be given consequence.
Id. at 169.
234. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 985-86.
235. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 1113, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008) (No. 05-CV-7340) [hereinafter EFF Howell Brief].
236. Id.
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authorize distribution or reproduce copies of the copyrighted works.237 Instead, the RIAA licensed MediaSentry to attempt to stop infringement.238
Therefore, the court concluded MediaSentry should not be considered a
copyright owner and any copies obtained by MediaSentry are a result of an
unauthorized distribution.239 However, the court determined a disputed issue of fact existed regarding Howell’s responsibility for making the files
available, and thus the court could not conclusively determine that Howell
was responsible.240
4.

Determining if Digital Transmissions Constitute Exchanges

The fourth and final step of the Howell court’s analysis explored the
nature of digital transmissions and file exchanges.241 The court concluded
that the RIAA failed to prove that an individual who places a copyrighted
work into a shared folder on a peer-to-peer network distributes the file
when a third-party downloads the copyrighted work.242 Under the court’s
analysis, the owner of the shared folder never makes or distributes an
unauthorized copy of the work.243 The owner’s copy of the work resides in
the owner’s shared folder on the owner’s hard drive, and at no time during
the file transfer process does that copy leave its location.244 Instead, a third
party makes a copy of a file located in the shared folder.245 The court determined this was insufficient to establish primary liability for copyright infringement of the distribution right, but noted that this potentially creates
secondary liability.246 The court faulted the RIAA for its failure to establish
the distribution requirement.247 The RIAA failed to explain the framework
of peer-to-peer networks in enough detail for the court to determine if the
owner of the shared folder actually distributed a copy of the work or simply
provided a third party with the ability to make a copy on the third party’s
own accord.248 The court further concluded that even if contributory liabil237. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (“Technically, ‘third parties are reaching into the individuals’ hard drive and taking
an electronic file,’ so ‘the individual who has the work on his or her hard drive [can potentially be
sued] for contributory infringement of the reproduction right’ but not primary infringement of the
distribution right.” (quoting PATRY, supra note 218, at 13)).
247. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
248. Id.
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ity applies, the RIAA must prove that a third party actually downloaded an
unauthorized copy of the copyrighted work.249 Congress did not intend the
language of section 106, “to do and to authorize,” to establish a new form
of liability for authorization detached from the legal consequences of authorized conduct.250
D. CAPITOL RECORDS, INC. V. THOMAS
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, Jammie Thomas, a single mother
from Minnesota, became the subject of the RIAA’s litigation against digital
piracy facilitated through peer-to-peer networks.251 On April 19, 2006,
Capitol Records filed a lawsuit against Thomas, alleging that she violated
section 106(3) by illegally downloading and distributing sound recordings
over a peer-to-peer network.252 Thomas downloaded 1,702 copyrighted
music files in her computer’s shared folder, all of which were available to
other peer-to-peer users for download.253 The RIAA alleged that Thomas
downloaded a majority of the music files without obtaining permission
from the copyright owners.254 Unusually, this case was not decided by
summary judgment, default, or settlement.255 On October 2, 2007, the case
became the first making available case tried by a jury.256
At trial, Thomas challenged the RIAA’s proposed jury instruction regarding the definition of distribution under the Copyright Act.257 The
instruction read, “[t]he act of making copyrighted sound recordings
available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without
license from the copyright owners, violated the copyright owners’ exclusive
right of distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been
shown.”258 After argument by the parties, the court used the RIAA’s proposed instruction as written.259 The instruction required the jury to find infringement if the jury determined that Thomas made the files available for
distribution.260 The jury did not need to find actual distribution.261 The

249. Id. at 987.
250. Id.
251. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (D. Minn. 2008).
252. Id.
253. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur, at 3, Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-2497).
254. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
255. Id. at 1213.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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jury returned a verdict finding that Thomas willfully infringed the copyright
on all twenty-four music files at issue.262 As a result, the jury awarded the
recording company statutory damages in the amount of $9,250 for each act
of infringement, totaling $222,000.263 The court entered the judgment on
October 5, 2007.264
However, on May 15, 2008, the court issued an Order requiring the
parties to submit briefs regarding whether the court committed a manifest
error of law and stating that the court was considering granting a new
trial.265 The court’s concern of committing a manifest error of law was
based upon the use of the RIAA’s proposed jury instructions, which allowed for the RIAA’s making available argument.266 The court ultimately
concluded that it committed an error of law and vacated the RIAA’s
favorable verdict.267 This decision repudiated the RIAA’s only success at
trial in its five-year copyright infringement litigation campaign.268
The court addressed many of the same issues and arguments articulated
in Howell, and its conclusions did not significantly differ from the determinations in Howell.269 One argument Thomas expanded upon was the definition of distribution in the Copyright Act.270 Further analysis of Thomas
also facilitates discussion of the implications of international treaties on the
interpretation of the Copyright Act.271 This article’s analysis of Thomas
concludes with a discussion on the large statutory damages awards allowed
by the Copyright Act.272

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1213, 1227.
264. Id. at 1213.
265. Id.
266. Id. Jury Instruction 15 contained the making available claim. Id.
267. Id. at 1228.
268. David Kravets, Judge Declares Mistrial in RIAA-Jammie Thomas Trial, Wired.com,
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/Not-for-publica/ (last visited October
13, 2008).
269. Compare Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (discussing the effect of an expanded definition of distribution, international treaties, and large statutory damages) with Atl. Recording Corp.
v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008) (providing analysis on how to interpret the
definition of distribution).
270. See discussion infra Part III.D.1.
271. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
272. See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
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Expanded Definition of Distribution

The court based part of its determination on how to properly define
“distribute.”273 Generally, the United States Supreme Court requires a
“strong presumption” that the plain language of a statute reflects Congress’
intent and should only be rebutted in “rare and exceptional
circumstances.”274 Under the plain language of section 106(3), Congress
clearly states that distribution may be effected by sale, transfer of ownership, rental, lease or lending.275 The Thomas court observed that Congress’
language in section 106(3) does not suggest that merely making a work
available for any of the listed activities constitutes a distribution.276
The Thomas court next looked to the ordinary dictionary meaning of
the word “distribute” to conclude that the word necessarily requires a transfer of ownership or possession.277 Furthermore, the leading copyright
treatises state that making a work available is insufficient to establish distribution.278 Alternatively, the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters,
opined to Congress in a 2002 letter that making a copyrighted work
available violates the distribution right.279 However, the Thomas court
noted that the rulings of the Register of Copyrights are not binding but are
worth noting because of their persuasiveness.280
The Thomas court also considered how other provisions of the United
States Code describe or define distribution, and in doing so the court found
that in at least one other provision Congress clearly defined distribution to
include offers to distribute.281 But other provisions in the Copyright Act
limit distribution to a physical transfer of copyrighted material.282 After
analyzing the differing definitions of distribution found within the
273. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
274. United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (2008).
275. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
276. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
277. Id. at 1217. The Thomas court cited Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.
1999) (“defining ‘distribute’ as, among other things, ‘1: to divide among several or many:
APPORTION’ and ‘b: to give out or deliver esp. to members of a group’”). Id.
278. See, e.g., 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 8.11[A] (2008) (stating that infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination of copies); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:11.50 (2009) (concluding that
making a work available is insufficient to establish distribution).
279. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1217-18; see 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(4) (2006) (“to ‘distribute’ means to sell, or to
lease, bail, or otherwise transfer, or to offer to sell, lease, bail or otherwise transfer”).
282. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; see 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (2006) (“For this purpose,
and other than as provided in [Section 115(c)(3)], a phonorecord is considered ‘distributed’ if the
person exercising the compulsory license has voluntarily and permanently parted with its
possession.”).
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Copyright Act, the Thomas court concluded that a uniform definition of the
word does not exist.283 Congress demonstrated that when it intends for the
definition of distribution to include “making available” or “offers to transfer,” it will explicitly list a definition of the term within the statute.284 By
all interpretations, the plain meaning of distribution requires actual
dissemination, and simply making a work available does not fit within that
meaning.285
2.

Impact of International Treaty Agreements

In a separate part of its analysis, the Thomas court examined the implications of international law.286 The United States is a party to the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and subscribes to the organization’s World Copyright Treaty (WCT) and Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT).287 The WCT and WPPT recognize and provide for a making available right that does not require evidence establishing that copies of
a copyrighted work were actually transferred to particular individuals.288
Considering both the executive and legislative branches of the government
agreed to adopt and ratify these treaties, it appears that American law is in
compliance with the treaties, and thus recognizes a making available
right.289 Additionally, under Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,290 the
United States Supreme Court established the Charming Betsy doctrine,
which requires courts to adopt a reasonable interpretation of the law so as to
ensure that the United States is in compliance with its treaty obligations.291
The court noted in its application of the Charming Betsy doctrine that
the WIPO treaties are neither self-executing nor legally binding, aside from
their implementation in the Copyright Act.292 Since a non-self-executing

283. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217-18.
284. Id. at 1218.
285. Id. at 1218-19.
286. Id. at 1225.
287. Id.
288. Id. (citing WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 6(1), art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; World Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 12(1) & (14), Dec.
20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203).
289. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
290. 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
291. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118. (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”).
292. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1365
(2008)). A self-executing treaty is law that becomes effective immediately in domestic courts of
the United States without requiring the implementation of an ancillary act of Congress or federal
law. 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS § 10.7 (2006).
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treaty requires legislation to make it law in the United States, the WIPO
treaties do not establish an enforceable making available right in peer-topeer file sharing cases.293 Only if section 106(3) is found ambiguous will
the treaty’s relevance be acknowledged.294 The doctrine creates a helpful
tool for the purpose of statutory construction, but “clear congressional action trumps customary international law and previously enacted treaties.”295
The court concluded its international treaty analysis by stating that compliance with the WIPO treaties would be improper because the United
States cannot override the clear congressional intent in section 106(3).296
3.

Oppressive Statutory Damages Awards

In its Memorandum and Order, the Thomas court petitioned Congress
to review the outdated Copyright Act and amend it to address both the liability and statutory damages that derive from peer-to-peer network cases.297
The court described the large statutory damage awards resulting from copyright cases as oppressive and grossly misapplied when applied to individual
consumers.298 The numerous cases cited by the RIAA in support of upholding the large statutory damages awards involve corporate or business defendants.299 In context, large damage awards deter future illegal commercial conduct.300 Significantly, the recent barrage of peer-to-peer copyright
infringement cases filed by the RIAA name individual consumers as
defendants.301 Individual consumer infringement is motivated by the simple desire to have the music for personal use and enjoyment.302 Consumers
do not attempt to seek profit from their acts of infringement.303
Thomas neither received commercial gain from her alleged infringement, nor sought any form of profit.304 The court noted that large statutory
damages are partly justified in copyright cases because the damages act as a
deterrent to infringement by making the penalty for infringing substantially

293. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (defining the effect of a self-executing treaty on the laws of the United States).
294. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
295. Id. (quoting Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2005)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1227.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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outweigh any potential gain.305 A particularly enticing lure that draws commercial entities to engage in copyright infringement is the potential realization of a tremendous increase in revenues.306 Alternatively, consumers who
infringe on peer-to-peer networks by downloading copyrighted music benefit by receiving access to free music, not the possibility of hundreds of
thousands of dollars in profits.307
Courts do not condone copyright infringement actions of individual
consumers, such as Thomas and Howell.308 Instead, the Thomas court simply labeled it absurd to compare the actions of consumers to those of global
commercial businesses and corporations.309 Awarding $220,000 in damages against an individual who downloads twenty-four songs from a peerto-peer network, which is the approximate equivalent of three CDs costing
less than $60, is “unprecedented and oppressive.”310
Congress wrote the Copyright Act with the intent to allow statutory
damages in amounts substantially more than the actual cost of the infringed
work.311 These damages accomplish the goal of Congress to deter infringement and encourage the legitimate purchase of copyrighted work.312 However, statutory damages awards of hundreds of thousands of dollars are
above and beyond the amount necessary to accomplish deterrence in individual consumer cases.313 Damages reaching approximately one hundred
times the cost of an infringed work act as an effective deterrent in actions
involving individual consumers.314
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should not respond to technological advancements by expanding the copyright protections established in the Copyright Act beyond Congress’ intent.315
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights
created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such
a calculus of interests.316
Courts recognized long before the 1976 Act that copyright protections, as
well as remedies for infringement, were entirely statutory.317 The United
States Supreme Court stressed through cases such as Teleprompter and
Bonito that a need for congressional guidance exists before courts rule and
create rights that are not explicit in the Copyright Act.318 In light of the history of the Copyright Act and subsequent case law, the proper way to handle questionable issues is to let Congress address them through the legislative process.319
Congress must revisit the Copyright Act of 1976 and modify the act to
suit today’s technological questions.320 The United States’ judicial system
would benefit if Congress would address the act’s ambiguous language.321
Congress would be prudent to define what exactly constitutes a distribution
in the age of the Internet, to determine if digital transmissions are truly distributions, and to address the constitutionality of the large statutory damages awarded against individual consumers.322 Additionally, the question
of whether making a copyrighted work available for distribution is intended
to be an independent right or if circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
prove distribution requires an answer.323 This answer should come from
the legislative branch, not the judicial.324
A clear definition of distribution is vital, especially in relation to the
prospectively large statutory damages awards likely to be encountered by
individual consumers accused of copyright infringement.325 Individual con-

316. Sony Corp. of Am. v. United City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
317. Id.
318. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Institute of William Mitchell College of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial at 21, Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) [hereinafter William Mitchell Thomas Brief];
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974); Bonito Boats, Inc.,
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1991).
319. See William Mitchell Thomas Brief, supra note 318.
320. See id. at 20-22 (stating that the proper recourse for the RIAA is to engage Congress
through the legislative process).
321. See id. (indicating that cases consistently explain that courts should refrain from creating rights that are not explicit in the Copyright Act).
322. Id.
323. See id. (stating that any future making available right should be left for Congress to
create and not the courts).
324. Id.
325. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008).
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sumers do not engage in infringement with the intention of gaining great
monetary profits, but do so because they desire to expand their personal
collections of music.326 Regardless of intentions, the actions of copyright
infringing consumers are not justified, but as the court stated in Thomas,
statutory damages awards of hundreds of thousands of dollars is above and
beyond the amount necessary to accomplish deterrence in individual consumer cases.327 “[S]urely [the] damages that are more than one hundred
times the cost of the works would serve as a sufficient deterrent” in infringement actions involving individual consumers.328 Congress must
amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to better regulate an increasingly
technological world.329
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326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. WESEMAN, supra note 15, at 1.
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